Comments
for the Record
United
States House of Representatives
Committee
on Ways and Means
Social
Security Subcommittee
Hearing on Examining Social Security’s Solvency
Challenge:
Status of the Social Security Trust Funds
Thursday,
June 7, 2018, 11:00 AM
By Michael G. Bindner
Center for Fiscal Equity
Chairman
Johnson and Ranking Member Larson, thank you for the opportunity to submit my
comments on this topic. These comments are an update to those provided last July
and the previous September, although truthfully not much has changed, except that
the tired old meme that we are stealing from the Trust fund by loaning it to the
General Fund is going around again. This is usually an indication that Wall Street
wants to make a run at using it as a source of fee income again, thinking that this
President will let them. I urge you to resist the urge to go along with such idiocy.
Someone has to be the grownup in the debate. Of course, if any such plan is proffered
before the election, the Democrats will certainly eat the GOP alive.
We will
leave it to the invited witnesses to explain the difference between the future
projections, except to say that both forecasts are required to be conservative.
As the Economic Policy Institute found
many years ago when attempts were being made to justify personal accounts in
Social Security, there is truly no solvency problem if more realistic estimates
are used. Of course, that relates to the
system as a whole, not on how the Trust Fund is to be reimbursed, as we
reiterate below.
Lessons from the Great Recession
The 2008 Recession
triggered by our continuing asset-based Depression has both temporary and
permanent effects on the trust fund’s cash flow. The temporary effect was a
decline in revenue caused by a slower economy and the temporary cut in payroll
tax rates to provide stimulus that has since been repealed, although the amount
was added to the Trust Fund for later withdrawal, regardless of contributions
not made.
The permanent
effect is the early retirement of many who had planned to work longer, but
because of the recent recession and slow recovery, this cohort has decided to
leave the labor force for good when their extended unemployment ran out. This
cohort is the older 77ers and 99ers who needed some kind of income to survive.
The combination of age discrimination and the ability to retire has led them to
the decision to retire before they had planned to do so, which impacts the cash
flow of the trust fund, but not the overall payout (as lower benefit levels
offset the impact of the decision to retire early on their total retirement
cost to the system). In addition, it has
been made easier for workers over 50 to retire on disability (as I have done),
with many of us approved on the first try.
The Reagan-Pepper Compromise
When Social
Security was saved in the early 1980s, payroll taxes were increased to build up
a Trust Fund for the retirement of the Baby Boom generation. The building of
this allowed the government to use these revenues to finance current
operations, allowing the President and his allies in Congress to honor their
commitment to preserving the last increment of his signature tax cut.
This trust
fund is now coming due, so it is entirely appropriate to rely on increased
income tax revenue to redeem them. It would be entirely inappropriate to renege
on these promises by further extending the retirement age, cutting promised
Medicare benefits or by enacting an across the board increase to the OASI payroll
tax as a way to subsidize current spending or tax cuts.
The cash
flow problem currently experienced by the trust fund is not the trust fund’s
problem, but a problem for the Treasury to address, either through further
borrowing – which will require continued comity on renewing the debt limit – or
the preferable solution, which higher taxes for those who received the lion’s
share of the benefit’s from the tax cuts of 1981, 1986, 2001, 2003 and 2010. Many also complain that this recovery is
anemic. That is likely because too many
upper-middle income taxpayers were given a permanent tax cut from 2001. Less savings and more taxation would boost
spending on both transfer payments and government purchases – especially
transfers to the retired and disabled.
What
most threatens the Trust fund is to do a tax cut under the guise of tax reform,
especially at the upper income levels.
Upper income families were given preference in the 1980s when OASI taxes
went up while the Reagan tax cuts were preserved. That should not happen again.
The ultimate cause of the trust fund’s long
term difficulties is not financial but demographic. Thus, the solution must
also be demographic – both in terms of population size and income distribution.
The largest demographic problem facing Social Security and the health care
entitlements, Medicare and Medicaid, is the aging of the population. In the
long term, the only solution for that aging is to provide a decent income for
every family through more generous tax benefits.
The free
market will not provide this support without such assistance, preferring
instead to hire employees as cheaply as possible. Only an explicit subsidy for
family size overcomes this market failure, leading to a reverse of the aging
crisis.
We propose a
$1000 per month refundable child tax credit payable with wages as part of our
proposal for a Net Business Receipts Tax.
This will take away the disincentive to have kids a slow economy
provides. Within twenty years, a larger number of children born translates into
more workers, who in another decade will attain levels of productivity large
enough to reverse the demographic time bomb faced by Social Security in the
long term.
Such an
approach is superior to proposals to enact personal savings accounts as an
addition to Social Security, as such accounts implicitly rely on profits from
overseas labor to fund the dividends required to fill the hole caused by the
aging crisis. This approach cannot succeed, however, as newly industrialized
workers always develop into consumers who demand more income, leaving less for
dividends to finance American retirements. The answer must come from solving
the demographic problem at home, rather than relying on development abroad.
This
proposal will also reduce the need for poor families to resort to abortion
services in the event of an unplanned pregnancy. Indeed, if state governments
were to follow suit in increasing child tax benefits as part of coordinated tax
reform, most family planning activities would be to increase, rather than
prevent, pregnancy. It is my hope that this fact is not lost on the Pro-Life
Community, who should score support for this plan as an essential vote in
maintaining a perfect pro-life voter rating.
This is not
to say that there is no room for reform in the Social Security program. As I
wrote in the January 2003 issue of Labor
and Corporate Governance, Congress should equalize the employer
contribution based on average income rather than personal income. It should
also increase or eliminate the cap on contributions. The higher the income cap
is raised, the more likely it is that personal retirement accounts are
necessary.
A major
strength of Social Security is its income redistribution function. I suspect
that much of the support for personal accounts is to subvert that function – so
any proposal for such accounts must move redistribution to account accumulation
by equalizing the employer contribution.
I propose
directing personal account investments to employer voting stock, rather than an
index funds or any fund managed by outside brokers. There are no Index Fund
billionaires (except those who operate them). People become rich by owning and
controlling their own companies. Additionally, keeping funds in-house is the
cheapest option administratively. I suspect it is even cheaper than the Social
Security system – which operates at a much lower administrative cost than any
defined contribution plan in existence.
If employer voting
stock is used, the Net Business Receipts Tax/Subtraction VAT would fund it. If there
are no personal accounts, then the employer contribution would be VAT funded.
Safety is,
of course, a concern with personal accounts. Rather than diversifying through
investment, however, I propose diversifying through insurance. A portion of the
employer stock purchased would be traded to an insurance fund holding shares
from all such employers. Additionally, any personal retirement accounts shifted
from employee payroll taxes or from payroll taxes from non-corporate employers
would go to this fund.
The insurance
fund will save as a safeguard against bad management. If a third of shares were
held by the insurance fund than dissident employees holding 25.1% of the
employee-held shares (16.7% of the total) could combine with the insurance fund
held shares to fire management if the insurance fund agreed there was cause to
do so. Such a fund would make sure no one loses money should their employer
fail and would serve as a sword of Damocles’ to keep management in line. This
is in contrast to the Cato/ PCSSS approach, which would continue the trend of
management accountable to no one. The other part of my proposal that does so is
representative voting by occupation on corporate boards, with either
professional or union personnel providing such representation.
The
suggestions made here are much less complicated than the current mix of
proposals to change bend points and make OASI more of a needs based program. If
the personal account provisions are adopted, there is no need to address the
question of the retirement age. Workers will retire when their dividend income
is adequate to meet their retirement income needs, with or even without a
separate Social Security program.
No other
proposal for personal retirement accounts is appropriate. Personal accounts
should not be used to develop a new income stream for investment advisors and
stock traders. It should certainly not result in more “trust fund socialism”
with management that is accountable to no cause but short term gain. Such
management often ignores the long-term interests of American workers and leaves
CEOs both over-paid and unaccountable to anyone but themselves.
Progressives
should not run away from proposals to enact personal accounts. If the proposals
above are used as conditions for enactment, I suspect that they won’t have to.
The investment sector will run away from them instead and will mobilize their
constituency against them. Let us hope that by then workers become invested in
the possibilities of reform.
All of the
changes proposed here work more effectively if started sooner. The sooner that
the income cap on contributions is increased or eliminated, the higher the
stock accumulation for individuals at the higher end of the age cohort to be
covered by these changes – although conceivably a firm could be allowed to opt
out of FICA taxes altogether provided they made all former workers and retirees
whole with the equity they would have otherwise received if they had started
their careers under a reformed system. I suspect, though, that most will continue
to pay contributions, with a slower phase in – especially if a slower phase in
leaves current management in place.
One new
wrinkle is that I would also put a floor in the employer contribution to OASI,
ending the need for an EITC – the loss would be more than up by gains from an
equalized employer contribution – as well as lowering the ceiling on benefits.
Since there will be no cap on the employer contribution, we can put in a lower
cap for the employee contribution so that benefit calculations can be lower for
wealthier beneficiaries, again reducing the need for bend points.
Thank you
for the opportunity to address the committee.
We are, of course, available for direct testimony or to answer questions
by members and staff.